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8

9 **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT**  
10 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
11 **SAN JOSE DIVISION**

12 In re: )  
 )  
13 **TECHNOLOGY PROPERTIES LIMITED LLC,** ) Case No. 13-51589-SLJ-11  
**fka TECHNOLOGY PROPERTIES LIMITED** )  
14 **INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION,** ) Chapter 11  
**fka TECHNOLOGY PROPERTIES LIMITED,** )  
15 **A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION,** ) Date: *[Pending entry of order]*  
 ) Time: *[Pending entry of order]*  
16 Debtor. ) Place: United States Bankruptcy Court  
 ) 280 S. First Street, Room 3099  
17 ) San Jose, CA 95113  
 ) Judge: Honorable Stephen L. Johnson  
18

19 **MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING LEAVE, STANDING AND AUTHORITY TO**  
20 **INVESTIGATE, COMMENCE, PROSECUTE AND SETTLE ACTIONS OF THE DEBTOR'S ESTATE**  
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1 The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) in the case of Technology  
2 Properties Limited, LLC (“TPL”, or the “Debtor”) hereby submits its MOTION FOR ORDER  
3 GRANTING LEAVE, STANDING AND AUTHORITY TO COMMENCE AND PROSECUTE CLAIMS OF THE  
4 DEBTOR’S ESTATE (the “Motion”) seeking authority pursuant to pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 1103  
5 and 1109 to investigate and prosecute actions against the Debtor’s insiders and affiliates, as detailed  
6 below. The Motion is based on the points and authorities below, the Motion itself, the notice of  
7 hearing on the Motion filed concurrently herewith, the pleadings and papers filed herein, and upon  
8 such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing on the Motion.

9 In support of the Motion, the Committee respectfully represents the following:

10 **I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

11 1. This Court has jurisdiction over this Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334.  
12 This Motion raises a core matter under 28 U.S. C. § 157(b)(2)(A). Venue of this case and this  
13 Motion is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. The statutory predicates  
14 for the relief sought herein are 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 1103 and 1109.<sup>1</sup>

15 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

16 **A. General**

17 2. On March 20, 2013 (the “Petition Date”), the Debtor commenced the above-entitled  
18 Chapter 11 bankruptcy case by filing a Voluntary Petition in this Court.

19 3. A trustee has not been appointed for the Debtor and it continues to function as the  
20 debtor-in-possession pursuant to §§ 1107 and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.

21 4. The Committee was appointed by the Office of the United States Trustee pursuant to  
22 § 1102 of the Bankruptcy Code.

23 5. As described by the Debtor in its DISCLOSURE STATEMENT RE: TPL PLAN OF  
24 REORGANIZATION (DECEMBER 23, 2013) [Docket No. 340] (the “December 23 Disclosure  
25 Statement”), TPL’s business is to maximize the value of patent portfolios. [December 23 Disclosure  
26 Statement, p. 13]. That business has essentially three components. In most cases, the owner of the

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>1</sup> All statutory references herein are to the title 11, United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) unless otherwise specified.

1 patent is an LLC owned directly or indirectly through a family trust (the “Leckrone Entity”) by the  
2 Debtor’s sole member and manager Daniel E. Leckrone (“Leckrone”). Typically, TPL is granted an  
3 exclusive license to commercialize a portfolio of patents in exchange for payment of a percentage of  
4 the revenue (65% of gross proceeds not to exceed 80% of net) to the Leckrone Entity. According to  
5 the Debtor, TPL then identifies companies whose products infringe the patents and works to license  
6 the technology to them. The December 23 Disclosure Statement explains that “TPL is in contract  
7 with Alliacense Limited LLC (“Alliacense”), a related entity, as its vendor or to provide TPL with  
8 much of the needed technical expertise in marketing services.” The third component of TPL’s  
9 business is to prosecute litigation against infringing companies that refuse to license patented  
10 technology.

11 **B. Relevant Case Developments**

12 6. Since the commencement of the case, the Committee has engaged the Debtor in  
13 negotiations in an attempt to reach agreement on a consensual plan. When it became clear that  
14 negotiating with the Debtor was futile and in light of the Debtor’s dubious financial performance  
15 during the Bankruptcy Case, the Committee filed its MOTION TO TERMINATE EXCLUSIVE PERIOD TO  
16 SOLICIT ACCEPTANCES OF PLAN OF REORGANIZATION AND TO FILE A COMPETING PLAN [Docket No  
17 269] (the “Exclusivity Termination Motion”) in order to facilitate the progression of the bankruptcy  
18 case and to enable the Committee to file its competing plan and disclosure statement for  
19 consideration by creditors and other parties in interest. After a hearing on December 5, 2013, the  
20 Court entered its Order terminating exclusivity as to the Debtor. Subsequently, on December 17,  
21 2013, the Committee filed the DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED  
22 CREDITORS’ PLAN OF REORGANIZATION (DATED DECEMBER 17, 2013) [Docket No. 322] and the  
23 OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED CREDITORS’ PLAN OF REORGANIZATION (DATED DECEMBER  
24 17, 2013) [Docket No. 321].

25 7. During the bankruptcy case, on April 3, 2013, the Debtor filed its MOTION  
26 REGARDING SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES (the “Settlement Motion”) seeking unilateral authority to  
27 enter into settlements of litigation. Both the United States Trustee and the Committee filed  
28 objections to the Settlement Motion because it requested a blanket authorization of settlements by

1 the Debtor without any notice to or review by the Court, the Committee or the United States Trustee.  
2 After a contested hearing, the Debtor and the Committee agreed on a protocol for the Debtor to seek  
3 the consent of a subcommittee of the Committee to enter into any settlements during the Bankruptcy  
4 Case. This protocol is reflected in the Court's ORDER ON MOTION REGARDING SETTLEMENT  
5 PROCEDURES (the "Settlement Protocol Order") entered on May 7, 2013.

6 8. During November 2013, the Committee became aware that the Debtor had violated  
7 the Settlement Protocol Order. On December 17, 2013, the Committee filed the MOTION OF  
8 CREDITORS' COMMITTEE FOR ORDERS: (1) DIRECTING THE APPOINTMENT OF A CHAPTER 11  
9 TRUSTEE; AND (2) DIRECTING THE DEBTOR AND DANIEL E. LECKRONE TO APPEAR AND SHOW  
10 CAUSE WHY THEY SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR VIOLATION OF THIS  
11 COURT'S ORDER [Docket No. 313] (the "Trustee Appointment Motion") due to the Debtor's  
12 violation and other reasons (including, *inter alia*, the Debtor's inherent conflicts of interest with  
13 respect to Alliacense and other affiliated parties, and the Debtor's bad faith and reprehensible  
14 behavior) as more fully set forth in the Trustee Appointment Motion.

15 9. During this bankruptcy case, the pleadings filed by the Debtor, the Committee and  
16 other parties in interest have raised various claims and established numerous grounds on which the  
17 Derivative Actions are based, including, without limitation, the following:

18 a. Within one year of the Petition Date, the Debtor made numerous transfers  
19 aggregating substantial amounts to insiders such as Leckrone, Alliacense, Susan Anhalt and Dwayne  
20 Hannah. AMENDED STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, Attachments to No. 3c and No. 23 [Docket  
21 No. 96].

22 b. The Debtor has scheduled debts to insiders based on compensation  
23 agreements between these insiders and Alliacense or "oral agreements" with these insiders.

24 c. Certain insider claims of persons characterized by the Debtor as the 13%ers  
25 are based on undocumented and invalid assignment agreements. [See OPPOSITION OF CREDITORS  
26 CHESTER A. BROWN JR. AND MARCIE BROWN TO THE MOTION OF TECHNOLOGY PROPERTIES  
27 LIMITED, LLC FOR APPROVAL OF DISCLOSURE STATEMENT (NOVEMBER 22, 2013), [Docket No.  
28 292], § I-A-5].

1 d. Common ownership by Leckrone of the Debtor, Alliacense and limited  
2 liability companies which own the intellectual property have raised issues of conflicts and loyalty  
3 and have resulted in questions regarding transfers of funds between the Debtor and Leckrone owned  
4 entities, raising the possibility of alter ego liability or substantive consolidation.

5 e. While it was insolvent and refusing to pay its non-insider creditors, TPL made  
6 distributions of over \$700,000 to Leckrone and funded his purchase of two separate entities. It also  
7 paid the operating expenses of such entities and of Alliacense.

### 8 III. RELIEF REQUESTED

9 10. While there is authority supporting a creditor's committee's right to prosecute actions  
10 on behalf of the estate, the Committee nevertheless seeks authority from the Court to investigate,  
11 commence and prosecute actions against the Debtor's sole member and manager and appointed  
12 Responsible Individual, Daniel E. Leckrone ("Leckrone"), all of the Debtor's affiliates including,  
13 without limitation, all entities wholly-owned or partially owned by Leckrone, and all insiders  
14 including, without limitation all directors, officers, and senior management, past and present  
15 (collectively, the "Derivative Action Defendants"). The Committee wishes to investigate and  
16 commence actions of any nature including, without limitation, any actions pursuant to Chapter 5 of  
17 the Bankruptcy Code, and any actions based on theories of breach of fiduciary duty, diminution of  
18 value, self-dealing, conflicts of interest, willful and malicious injury, intentional and negligent  
19 misrepresentations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, ultra vires acts, usurping corporate  
20 opportunities, fraud, defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, theft, embezzlement, larceny  
21 and conversion<sup>2</sup> (collectively, the "Derivative Actions").

### 22 IV. LEGAL AUTHORITY

#### 23 A. The Committee Has Standing To Prosecute Actions.

24 11. The Northern California bankruptcy court has stated that a creditors committee  
25 possesses standing to bring claims on behalf of the estate. *Variable-Parameter Future Dev. Corp. v.*

26 <sup>2</sup> The Committee also will be filing objections to Proofs of Claims filed by certain Derivative Action  
27 Defendants. Pursuant to sections 502(a) and 1109, the Committee believes that it possesses standing to file such  
28 objections. *See Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Monsanto Co. (In re Solutia Inc.)*, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2295  
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2006). However, to the extent Court approval and standing is required to file objections to  
claims, the Committee includes all such objections as "Derivative Actions."



1 *Comerica Bank-California (In re Morpheus Lights)*, 228 B.R. 449, 453 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998).

2 However, the Committee is cognizant that some courts have required that a committee must obtain a  
3 grant of derivative standing from the court before proceeding. In the instance this Court is inclined  
4 to enforce such requirement, the Committee files this Motion.

5 **B. Derivative Standing May Be Conferred On The Committee.**

6 12. The Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee or the debtor-in-possession to pursue  
7 avoidance actions on behalf of the estate and obligates such estate representatives to maximize value  
8 for the benefit of creditors. *Commodity Futures Trading Comm 'n v. Weintraub*, 471 U.S. 343, 352  
9 (1985). However, because authorization is discretionary, a debtor-in-possession will often be  
10 conflicted and motivated not to pursue avoidance actions against certain potential defendants, to the  
11 detriment of non-defendant creditors. *In re Catwil Corp.*, 175 B.R. 362, 365 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994)  
12 (“The inherent conflict of interest between Catwil [debtor-in-possession] and the insider-defendants  
13 made it unlikely that Catwil would initiate an avoidance action against the defendants.”); *Official*  
14 *Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery*, 330 F.3d 548, 573 (3d Cir.  
15 2003) (en banc) (noting that “[fraudulent conveyances] present a particularly vexing problem in  
16 reorganizations conducted under Chapter 11.”); *Canadian Pac. Forest Prods. v. J.D. Irving, Ltd. (In*  
17 *re Gibson Group)*, 66 F.3d 1436, 1441 (6th Cir. 1995) (“A debtor-in-possession often acts under the  
18 influence of conflicts of interest and may be tempted to use its discretion under Sections 547 and 548  
19 as a sword to favor certain creditors over others, rather than as a tool to further its reorganization for  
20 the benefit of all creditors as Congress intended. Given this reality, we do not believe Congress  
21 intended to exclude creditors from seeking to avoid preferential or fraudulent transfers where the  
22 debtor-in-possession abuses its discretion.”).

23 13. The conflicts of interests may be inherently present even outside of the “fox guarding  
24 the henhouse” scenario, where debtor’s management is not directly acting in its own self-interests:  
25 “[A] debtor may be unwilling to pursue claims against individuals or businesses, such as critical  
26 suppliers, with whom it has an ongoing relationship that it fears damaging ... even if a bankrupt  
27 debtor is willing to bring an avoidance action, it might be too financially weakened to advocate  
28 vigorously for itself. In any of these situations, the real losers are the unsecured creditors whose

1 interests avoidance actions are designed to protect.” *Cybergenics*, 330 F.3d at 573 (internal citation  
2 omitted).

3 14. To ameliorate these concerns, unsecured creditor committees are often tasked with  
4 derivative standing to provide “a critical safeguard against lax pursuit of avoidance actions.” *Id.*; see  
5 also *Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. of Spaulding Composites Co. (In*  
6 *re Spaulding Composites Co.)*, 207 B.R. 899, 904 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Cal. 1997) (“The DIP has an  
7 obligation to pursue all actions that are in the best interests of creditors and the estate ... An  
8 unsecured creditors' committee has a close identity of interests with the DIP in this regard. Allowing  
9 the DIP to coordinate litigation responsibilities with an unsecured creditors' committee can be an  
10 effective method for the DIP to manage the estate and fulfill its duties.”).

11 15. Accordingly, courts will often grant derivative standing to a committee to investigate  
12 and initiate adversary proceedings or contested matters in the name of the debtor-in-possession  
13 under Sections 1103(c)(5) and 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and in fact, “every circuit ... which  
14 has addressed the issue has recognized the possibility of derivative standing to pursue avoidance  
15 actions on behalf of a bankruptcy estate under certain circumstances.” *PW Enters. v. North Dakota*  
16 *(In re Racing Servs.)*, 363 B.R. 911, 914-915 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2007)(citing cases). The standing  
17 confers rights which extend to all suits that the debtor may bring under Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy  
18 Code and applicable non-bankruptcy law. See *Cybergenics*, 330 F.3d at 567-69.

19 **C. Vesting Derivative Standing In The Committee Is Appropriate.**

20 16. Generally, courts will review four requirements to determine whether derivative  
21 standing should be vested in third-party such as a creditors committee as follows:

- 22 a. The claim must be colorable;
- 23 b. The committee must either make a demand upon the debtor to bring the action  
24 or establish that such demand is excused;
- 25 c. The debtor must either unjustifiably refuse to bring the claim or be excused  
26 from taking such action; and
- 27 d. The committee must obtain leave from the court before suing.

28 *In re First Capital Holdings Corp.*, 146 B.R. 7, 11 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992); see also *Hansen v. Finn*  
*(In re Curry & Sorensen, Inc.)*, 57 B.R. 824, 828 (9th Cir. BAP 1986).

1                   **1. The Claim Must Be Colorable.**

2           17. Courts have found that a colorable claim need only be “plausible.” *See, e.g., In re*  
3 *LTV Steel Co.*, 333 B.R. 397, 406 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (“A colorable claim is defined as one  
4 which is plausible or ‘not without merit’”); *see also, e.g., Elstner-Bailey v. Fannie Mae (In re*  
5 *Elstner-Bailey)*, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 4802, 9-10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Oct. 4, 2011) (in relief from stay  
6 context, quoting Cornell University Law School’s Legal Information Institute’s definition as: “A  
7 plausible legal claim. In other words, a claim strong enough to have a reasonable chance of being  
8 valid if the legal basis is generally correct and the facts can be proven in court. The claim need not  
9 actually result in a win.”). Thus, the standard to establish whether an underlying claim is colorable  
10 is not onerous and merely requires, as with defeating a motion to dismiss, assertion of claims “that  
11 on appropriate proof would support a recovery.” *In re G-I Holdings, Inc.*, 313 B.R. 612, 631 (Bankr.  
12 D.N.J. 2004); *see also In re STN Enterprises*, 779 F.2d 901, 905-06 (2d Cir. 1985) (court need not  
13 conduct mini-trial to determine whether “colorable” claim has been presented); *Official Comm. of*  
14 *Unsecured Creditors of America’s Hobby Ctr., Inc. v. Hudson United. Bank (In re America’s Hobby*  
15 *Ctr., Inc.)*, 223 B.R. 275, 288 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (observing that standing should be denied  
16 only if the claim is “facially defective”).

17           18. It is clear that there is a basis to the Derivative Action claims<sup>3</sup>. As noted above, the  
18 Debtor’s Statement of Financial Affairs sets forth several transfers to insiders. A cursory  
19 examination of Proofs of Claims filed by certain insiders based on incentive compensation  
20 demonstrates the questionable nature of the Debtor’s compensation paid to its insider employees.  
21 [See Proofs of Claims Nos. 17, 27, 30, 35, 39]. Generally, these insider claims are largely based on  
22 agreements, either written or “oral” which purport to be with Alliacense and/or some other TPL  
23 affiliate, not TPL, and in that regard, should not exist against the Debtor.

24           19. In addition, Leckrone has directed TPL to pay Alliacense at least \$42,000,000  
25 without a written contract and an additional \$15 million for “operating expenses.” [See  
26 DECLARATION OF SALLIE KIM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION OF CREDITORS’ COMMITTEE FOR ORDERS: (1)  
27 APPOINTING A CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE; AND (2) DIRECTING DANIEL E. LECKRONE TO APPEAR AND

28           <sup>3</sup> Other colorable claims are set forth in the Exclusivity Termination Motion and the Trustee Appointment  
Motion.

1 SHOW CAUSE WHY HE SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATION OF THIS COURT'S  
2 ORDER [Docket 313-3] (the "Kim Declaration"), Exhibit "A", p. 1156: 14 – 21]. There was no  
3 signed written agreement between TPL and Alliacense authorizing any payments to Alliacense.  
4 [Kim Decl., Exhibit "A", pp. 234: 8 – 12 and 291: 10–14]. Furthermore, Dwayne Hannah, TPL's  
5 Chief Financial Officer, testified that TPL listed the payment of \$15 million as a loan to Alliacense  
6 and thus an asset of TPL. [Kim Declaration, Exhibit "A", p. 1156:14 – 21]. The two entities even  
7 share employees, some of which are the insiders who now assert substantial claims in the bankruptcy  
8 case. [December 23 Disclosure Statement, Exhibit C-1].

9       20. It is imperative that the Derivative Actions are thoroughly investigated and, if  
10 appropriate, vigorously pursued. Time is of the essence in this matter. The Debtor's deficient  
11 performance during the case has led only to a substantial loss to the estate (with a proportional gain  
12 to many, if not all, of the Derivative Defendants), and, as demonstrated by its consummation of  
13 settlements in violation of the Settlement Procedures Order over the Committee's objection, the  
14 Debtor's management will continue to dissipate estate assets to benefit only themselves. The  
15 Committee understands that affirmative claims against the Derivative Defendants may be the largest,  
16 if not only, asset which may realize a return to non-insider creditors. In addition, unsecured claims  
17 approximate \$50 million in the case, but approximately \$37 million are held by just eight insiders.  
18 Accordingly, the Debtor is able to manipulate and control the plan confirmation voting process  
19 through the votes of its insiders,<sup>4</sup> a process the Debtor previously was attempting to consummate  
20 without any alternatives for creditors until the Court approved the Exclusivity Termination over the  
21 Debtor's opposition.

22 ///

23 ///

24 ///

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>4</sup> The Debtor will no doubt argue that because under its proposed Plan, a third party trustee will be able to  
27 prosecute claims, there is no need for the Committee to do so. However, this argument simply ignores the fact that the  
28 Debtor's Plan, which continues to perpetuate the management structure, self-dealing, transfers to insiders and conflicts  
discussed herein [*see, e.g.*, discussion at sec. II-B-1 and II-B-2 of OBJECTION OF OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF UNSECURED  
CREDITORS TO DEBTOR'S DISCLOSURE STATEMENT RE: TPL PLAN OF REORGANIZATION (NOVEMBER 22, 2013) [Docket  
No. 298] will have already been confirmed.

1                   **2. The Committee Is Excused From Demanding That The Debtor Prosecute**  
2                   **the Derivative Actions And Demonstrating That The Debtor Refuses to**  
3                   **Bring Such Actions.**

4           21. The second and third requirements are appropriately addressed together. In this  
5 instance, the conflicts of interest between the Debtor, Leckrone and all Derivative Action  
6 Defendants are so profound that any demand would be futile. In fact, even if the Debtor were to  
7 commence any of the Derivative Actions, it is unrealistic to expect that the Debtor would do so  
8 vigorously and to expect a maximum (or any) return for the estate.

9           22. Bankruptcy courts routinely excuse the demand and refusal requirements when an  
10 inherent conflict is present such as when the claims at issue would be asserted against management  
11 or directors who would be required to investigate and prosecute such claims. *See In re First Capital*  
12 *Holdings Corp.*, 146 B.R. 7, 12-13 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992); *see also Official Comm. of Unsecured*  
13 *Creditors of Nat'l Forge Co. v. Clark (In re Nat'l Forge Co.)*, 326 B.R. 532, 544 (W.D. Pa. 2005);  
14 *Louisiana World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re Louisiana World Exposition)*, 832 F.2d 1391  
15 1397-98 (5th Cir. 1987).

16           23. Policy considerations behind the formal demand requirement are not in play here. As  
17 stated by the *Nat'l Forge* Court, “[t]he policy concerns underlying the general requirement of a  
18 formal demand are to ensure that the debtor is (i) informed of the committee’s intent to assert the  
19 subject claims and (ii) afforded an opportunity to explain its reasons, if any, for declining to pursue  
20 the claims itself.” *In re Nat'l Forge Co.*, 326 B.R. at 544. Here, the Committee has already  
21 communicated its intent to investigate and prosecute the Derivative Claims. [See Para. 4d to  
22 DECLARATION OF THOMAS T. HWANG IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE MOTION FOR ORDER SHORTENING  
23 TIME FOR HEARING ON MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING LEAVE, STANDING AND AUTHORITY TO  
24 COMMENCE AND PROSECUTE CLAIMS OF THE DEBTOR’S ESTATE, filed on January 13, 2014].  
25 Moreover, the reason for the Debtor’s management not pursuing the Derivative Claims against its  
26 own self-interests is obvious. Consequently, due to the inherent conflicts presented by the  
27 Derivative Actions, the Committee respectfully submits that the Court excuse it from meeting these  
28 requirements.

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**3. The Committee Must Obtain Leave From The Court.**

24. By this Motion, the Committee is attempting to satisfy this requirement.

**D. The Debtor Should Be Directed To Provide Unfettered Access to Its Documents, Both Privileged and Non-Privileged.**

25. In order to properly and thoroughly investigate the Derivative Claims, with derivative standing and in the capacity of an estate representative, the Committee requires access to the books and records and other documents in the Debtor’s possession. Bankruptcy Code section 105 provides broad authority for the Court to issue any order that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Code. 11 U.S.C §105(a).

26. In addition, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d), the Court is authorized to provide the Committee with direct access to all of the Debtor’s privileged and non-privileged documents on the basis that such disclosure will not waive any applicable attorney-client privilege or work product protection. *See* Fed. R. Evid. 502(d) (“A Federal court may order that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the court--in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other Federal or State proceeding”); *see also, e.g., Whitaker Chalk Swindle & Sawyer, LLP v. Dart Oil & Gas Corp.*, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15901, at \*9-12 (N.D. Tx. Feb. 23, 2009) (issuing an order that discovery proceed conditioned on the protection of Fed. R. Evid. 502). Confidentiality concerns are further safeguarded by that certain CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT effective as of April 17, 2013, executed by the Debtor and each of the Committee members during this bankruptcy case.

27. Together, Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) and section 105 provide the basis for the Court to authorize access to the Debtor’s books and records to the Committee for its investigation and prosecution of the estate’s Derivative Claims. Therefore, the Committee requests that the Court order the Debtor to provide the Committee with unfettered access to all of the books, records, and other documents in the possession, custody, or control of the Debtor, or in which the Debtor has an interest as property of the estate, whether or not the documents are subject to a claim of privilege or confidentiality, and to decree that such access shall not constitute a waiver of any privilege that protects disclosure of such documents.

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V. CONCLUSION

28. In sum, the Debtor's management and officers have unquestionably made transfers to insiders and affiliates, including to relatives and entities owned by Leckrone. They have continued to justify their misconduct with retroactive explanations, attenuated legal theories, undocumented transfers and "oral" agreements. While stockpiling their own riches, they have caused millions of dollars of damages to creditors and the estate. And while the Debtor's management have pointed to the discretion afforded under the business judgment rule in operating TPL, their self-interest prevents management from relying on the business judgment rule to justify their actions. *See Adams v. Calvarese Farms Maint. Corp.*, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at \*71 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2010) (noting that "business judgment rule would not apply to actions taken in bad faith or otherwise in the context of a breach of the duty of loyalty").

29. It is clear that numerous colorable claims exist against the Derivative Defendants and that the Debtor's management is not only disinterested in pursuing the Derivative Claims but will persist in defending against them. Therefore, the Committee submits that it is the appropriate party to investigate, commence and prosecute the Derivative Claims.

Wherefore, based on the foregoing, the Committee respectfully request that the Court enter its order;

1. Granting the Motion;
2. Granting leave, derivative standing and authority in the Committee to investigate, commence and prosecute any and all of the Derivative Actions against the Derivative Defendants;
3. Directing the Debtor to provide the Committee with unfettered access to all of the books, records, and other documents in the possession, custody, or control of the Debtor, or in which the Debtor has an interest as property of the estate, whether or not the documents are subject to a claim of privilege or confidentiality;
4. Decreeing that access to such documents by the Committee shall not constitute a waiver of any privilege that protects disclosure of such documents; and

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1           5.       Granting such other and further relief as is just and appropriate.

2 Dated: January 13, 2014

DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP

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By: /s/ Robert A. Franklin  
Robert A. Franklin  
Attorneys for the  
Official Unsecured Creditors Committee

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