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14	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	
15	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, DIVISION 5	
16		
10	In re	Case No: 13-51589 SLJ
17	III IC	Chapter 11
18	TECHNOLOGY PROPERTIES LIMITED,	Chapter 11
⊥0		Date: August 10, 2016
19	LLC, Debtor.	Time: 2:00 p.m.
_		Place: Courtroom 3099
20		280 South First Street
21		San Jose, California
22		[Pleading Title]
	RESPONSE BY REORGANIZ	ZED DEBTOR TO MOTION TO
23	CLARIFY AND IMPLEMENT PRIOR ORDERS (DKT #743 & #744)	
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RESPONSE BY REORGANIZED DEBTOR TO MOTION TO CLARIFY AND IMPLEMENT PRIOR ORDERS (DKT #743 & #744)

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## I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

- 1. Reorganized debtor Technology Properties Limited, LLC ("TPL") and MCM Portfolio, LLC ("MCM") have survived the often tumultuous marriage of their interests in the CORE Flash portfolio dating back to confirmation of the Plan<sup>1</sup>. Tensions exist, in part, because MCM has, without agreement from TPL insinuated into CORE Flash license settlements licenses of the '549 patent when settling CORE Flash claims. The absence of a set percentage for compensation to MCM for '549 Patent licenses and settlements has also interfered with the ability of TPL and MCM to work together efficiently to generate settlements where both patents are required.
- 2. There are two primary questions raised in the Motion<sup>2</sup>: (1) what are the rights of the parties as regards the so-called '549 Patent; and (2) how should the "waterfall" set forth in Exhibit "C" to the Plan be applied to divide proceeds from settlements. The answers are uncomplicated: (1) MCM, without question, owns and controls the '549 patent; TPL has no right, title or interest in it absent consent from MCM, though proceeds from it at present remain outside the "waterfall"; and (2) MCM is entitled to be paid its license fee for CORE Flash settlement directly from the trust account of Special Counsel but, having fired Special Counsel<sup>3</sup>, it has no right to instruct that counsel what to do with proceeds, and it has no ability to refuse to sign off on CORE Flash settlements or licenses going forward that TPL negotiates<sup>4</sup>.
- 3. The following two solutions as to the '549 Patent issue are under discussion. First, MCM and TPL need to document agreement as to the set percentage MCM requested so that TPL can

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Joint Plan of Reorganization By Official Committee Of Unsecured Creditors and Debtor (Dated January 8, 2015)(the "Plan").

Motion to Clarify and Implement Prior Orders (Dkt #743 & #744)(the "Motion")

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Simon Law Firm, P.C. ("Special Counsel").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Plan, 42:26-43:3.

offer the '549 Patent to any defendant settling or party interested in acquiring a license.

Second, TPL and MCM can then document that MCM would be paid for any license of a '549

Patent "off the top" of any settlement and directly from the trust account of counsel without reduction for Special Counsel's legal fees or costs.

4. As regards the waterfall, it is undisputed that MCM is at present to receive the 20% of the net proceeds after the payment of (a) the estimated 15% of expenses to Alliacence, (b) the estimated 15% of litigation expenses to counsel; and the estimated combined 32% of contingency fees owed to special and local counsel where litigation is involved (and 5.7% where no litigation is involved). A major issue remaining is how to ensure that TPL receives adequate notice of and support for expenses incurred so that it is not compelled to assert control over proceeds to try to protect the estate and creditors from unanticipated and potentially excessive expenses.

## II. RESPONSES TO FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

- 5. TPL does not dispute the factual allegations and recitations from court-filed pleadings contained in MCM's supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities (the "MPA") from 1:18 to 4:1 (or the matching factual claims made in paragraphs 1-8 of the Anhalt Declaration<sup>5</sup>) as regards the '549 Patent and how the current arrangement memorialized in the '549 Order was reached. TPL acknowledges, without qualification, that it no longer has any right, title or interest in the '549 Patent under the terms of the '549 Order.
- 6. TPL disagrees with claims made in the MPA at 4:2-9 but cannot at this time say more than that. The settlement negotiations that took place with respect to Epson as to CORE Flash and the related '549 Patent are confidential. They cannot be addressed or fairly countered in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Declaration of Susan Anhalt in Support of Motion to Clarify and Implement Prior Orders (the "Anhalt Declaration").

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public in the context of the Motion. Should a claim for damages and an actual case or controversy be presented to the Court as regards the Epson (or any other) settlement, then TPL will seek to have all discovery and proceedings with respect thereto conducted under seal and contest inaccurate assertions vigorously. The Court should be advised that the Epson settlement was concluded and is no longer at issue. Neither TPL nor Special Counsel are holding any funds to disburse under the waterfall The Canon litigation does not seem to implicate the '549 Patent as yet but this is anticipated as was the case in the Epson and HP settlement. No other litigation has yet been commenced to enforce CORE Flash IP rights.

7. TPL also does not dispute the statements in the MPA at 4:18-5:3 as regards the waterfall and its development. TPL agrees that Exhibit "C" to the Plan represents the agreement of the parties and a court-approved modification of the flow of CORE Flash proceeds under the assumed Commercialization Agreement. TPL acknowledges and accepts that the waterfall set forth in Exhibit "C" to the Plan is controlling as regards the proceeds from licenses and settlements of CoreFlash technology. Exhibit "C" provides as follows in pertinent part:

# C. Core Flash litigation proceeds:

- (1) Litigation expenses (est. 15%) and contingency fee (32%) and Alliacense (15%) of gross proceeds to the extent that the license isprocured by Alliacense;
- (2) 80% retained by TPL for operations and payments to creditors and 20% to Leckrone.

### D. Core Flash non-litigation proceeds:

- (1) Expenses 15%;
- Contingency atty: 5.7%;
- (3) Alliacense: 15% of gross proceeds to the extent that the license is procured by Alliacense: and
- (4) 80% retained by TPL for operations and payments to creditors and 20% to Leckrone.

- 8. The '549 Patent is not part of the waterfall. TPL agrees that, assuming it and MCM are in concert as to the set percentage of proceeds for any license of CORE Flash technology that also includes a '549 Patent license, MCM will be paid that percentage from the gross proceeds with no deduction for legal expenses or the contingency fees of counsel. This is the case because MCM terminated Special Counsel and any contingency claim Special Counsel might have had, and because the '549 Patent will not be asserted as at issue in any future litigation by TPL.
- 9. The allegations and arguments in the MPA from 5:4-28 are reflective of the desire of the TPL Board to impose, through the 8 points and proposed payment protocol, some order on a chaotic payment process involving expenses only estimated in the waterfall. What motivated TPL was (a) the regular practice of Alliacense to present potential settlements at the last minute for approval stating deals would fail if not immediately approved, and (b) send final bills for services rendered with a demand that they be paid in 24-48 hours under the threat that information necessary for counsel to proceed in litigation would be withheld and the refusal of MCM to sign off on settlements unless bills had been paid. TPL believes that it should have not less than 15-days to pay any invoice and that invoices must be sufficiently detailed to allow TPL's CEO and Board to fairly assess what was done and if there has been an overcharge. TPL further believes that there must be prior authorization before expenses are incurred.
- 10. A final relevant concern appears in the MPA at 6:5-11, where MCM asserts that TPL has demanded that MCM sign documents that are factually incorrect. Without responding to the specifics of the assertion, MCM is without discretion when it comes to TPL's decisions to the terms of licensing of CORE Flash technology (other than the '549 Patent). The Plan is unambiguous on this point and provides as follows:

The MCM Commercialization Agreement shall be modified as follows: as a condition of assumption, TPL shall, at the Effective Date, reconvey all right, title and interest in the CORE Flash portfolio on account of its license back to MCM. TPL will continue to commercialize and negotiate licenses of CORE Flash patents and technology without change. It will earn precisely the same revenue it does under the current arrangement. MCM shall execute license agreements at the direction of TPL, and MCM will have no discretion to refuse to do so.

Plan, 42:26-43:3.

11. In the Bushnell transaction MCM refused to sign off on the settlement without certain expenses being paid. TPL cannot and will not seek to compel MCM to execute documents that are factually untrue and could give rise to liability for it, but it cannot allow MCM to refuse to execute licenses that TPL negotiates. MCM, because it writes the licenses themselves, is a scrivener subject to the exception stated in this paragraph, and the Court should find that it is obligated to write licenses as directed.

## III. ARGUMENT

- A. There Is No Dispute as to What the '549 Order or Waterfall Provide.
- 12. As was set forth above, TPL acknowledges the clear terms of the '549 Order. It has no right, title or interest in the '549 Patent and will not seek to negotiate licenses of it without MCM's consent and has not done. Such consent is the subject of the aforementioned negotiations to set a percentage for MCM in any future settlement negotiation in which a '549 Patent license is included. TPL also does not dispute that the waterfall in Plan Exhibit "C' is controlling as to the distribution of settlement proceeds.
  - B. The Relief Requested by the Motion is Unavailable to MCM.
  - 13. In the conclusion of the MPA MCM asks the Court for the following relief:

The Court should clarify and implement that Order by instructing TPL not to further communicate with anyone about the '549 Patent, to abstain from efforts to license the '549 Patent and not to attempt to control the disbursement of funds relating to the '549 Patent. ...

The Court should clarify and implement that Order by requiring TPL promptly to disburse funds that are the subject of the Commercialization Agreement in the manner provided by Exhibit C to the Plan.

MPA, 10:2-12.

14. The requested "instructions" amount to injunctive relief not available to a movant in a contested matter. "FRBP 7001 mandates that proceedings for injunctions or for declaratory judgments be brought as adversary proceedings. FRBP 7001(7) & (9)." Lawson v. NationsBanc Mortg. Corp. (In re Lawson), 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 2208, \*12 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2000). Even were the Court to treat the Motion as a contested matter, it fails to meet the high evidentiary and legal burdens of a moving party under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7065 for the Court to issue an injunction. Judge Peter Carroll in the case below explains why this is so:

Rule 65(a)(1) permits the court to issue a preliminary injunction on notice to the adverse party. F.R.Civ.P. 65(a) (1). "A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right." Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., \_\_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_\_, 129 S. Ct. 365, 376, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008); see Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 128 S.Ct. 2207, 2218-2219, 171 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) ("A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy."). [836] A prohibitory injunction prevents parties from taking action and "preserve[s] the status quo pending a determination of the action on the merits." Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1988); see Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328, 1333, 104 S. Ct. 10, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1431 (1983) (stating that a prohibitory injunction "freezes the positions of the parties until the court can hear the case on the merits").

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must "establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374; see Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009). "In each case, courts 'must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief." Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 376 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542, 107 S. Ct. 1396, 94 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1987)).

Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Nilson (In re Woodside Group, LLC), 427 B.R. 817, 835-836, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 236, \*48-51 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010)

- C. There is No Case or Controversy Before the Court and Therefore No Jurisdiction to Hear the Motion.
- 15. As is set forth above, TPL does not dispute the terms of the '549 Order or the Plan. There are no funds being withheld by TPL or its counsel. MCM is asking the Court to rule on a potential dispute about a future settlement in litigation that most likely has not even been filed. This suggests that there is no case or controversy before the Court and an absence of subject matter jurisdiction.

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases" or "controversies," as distinguished from advisory opinions. Olin Corp. v. Consol. Aluminum Corp., 5 F.3d 10, 17 (2d Cir. 1993).

The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that, "In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). However, the Declaratory Judgment Act does not—and cannot—confer subject matter jurisdiction. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 241 F.3d at 177; Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 272, 61 S. Ct. 510, 85 L. Ed. 826 (1941). "Subject matter jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act is limited to an actual

controversy, and is coextensive with the case or controversy standard embodied in Article III of the Constitution." In re Quigley Co., Inc., 361 B.R. 723, 736 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Put more simply, if there is no case or controversy, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See, e.g., S. Jackson & Son, Inc. v. Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exch. Inc., 24 F.3d 427, 431 (2d Cir. 1994). The party seeking a declaratory judgment "bears the burden of proving that the Court has jurisdiction." E.R. Squibb & Sons, 241 F.3d at 177 (citing Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83,95, 113 S. Ct. 1967, 124 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1993)).

An actual controversy "must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." Aetna Life Ins. of Hartford v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241, 57 S. Ct. 461, 81 L. Ed. 617 (1937). According to the Supreme Court:

United States Dep't of the Treasury v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation Co., 475 B.R. 347, 358, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96039, \*23, 2012 WL 2822547 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

16. The citation to the In re Pegasus Gold Corp.,394 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2005) is distinguishable. In that case the Court was faced with a dispute over proofs of claims pertaining to appellee debtors' environmental clean-up obligations in the debtors' bankruptcy that was settled and a subsequent filed by the debtors filed in bankruptcy court alleging contract claims stemming from the State's alleged breach of the agreement. There was nothing hypothetical about the claimed breach.

### IV. CONCLUSION

17. TPL understands that it is bound by the '549 Order not to license the '549 Patent without MCM's consent – something that it hopes will be forthcoming and presented to the Court in a stipulation before the hearing. TPL further understands that it has to comply with the